Yesterday’s New York Times article on Obama as a law professor offers much to consider, once you get past the author’s obvious love affair with the president’s so-called pragmatism. There are three points in the article worth discussing: (1) judicial pragmatism; (2) judicial minimalism; (3) potential nominees to fill Souter’s seat.
First, pragmatism. It may be a beneficial trait in a politician, but pragmatism is the antithesis of a proper judicial attitude. Pragmatism connotes a willingness to approach every issue with an open mind and a commitment to finding the best outcome for every problem, regardless of preconceived ideology. Obama is the quintessential judicial pragmatist, the article claims; he cares not a whit for “high theory.” In this regard, Obama’s pragmatism in this regard is equated with reasonableness. He does not always strive for the liberal or conservative outcome; he merely wants results that are reasonable in any particular case. Now, to be sure, no judge should strive for a liberal or conservative agenda in all cases, and of course every judge must approach each case free of preconceived notions of how that case should be resolved. But it does not follow that job of a judge is to consider what the most reasonable policy outcome of a case is, and decide the case on those grounds. The role of a judge is to apply the law – constitution, statutes, regulations, and prior cases – to the particular set of facts before him. Ideally, judges would be like calculators with robes and lifetime tenure: plug in the facts, plug in the law, and they would spit out the correct answer. And if the law you feed in is garbage, the answer you get out should be garbage as well; a judge is not free to tweak the input or the output simply because he thinks it smells bad. In the end, Obama’s disregard of “high theory” is simply a lack of firm commitment to the mandates of our legal texts. And let’s be realistic: the article’s implicit endorsement of pragmatism over “abstraction” is an implicit dig at the Court’s current champion of abstract high theory, Antonin Scalia. The popular narrative of Scalia’s jurisprudence often grants that he is a principled jurist but holds that his commitment to principle (in Scalia’s case, the “conservative” principle of originalist interpretation) comes at the cost of ignoring the real-life consequences of the Court’s decisions, which all too often hurt the little guy. Scalia is too principled, it seems. But a brief glance at his actual record quickly explodes the notion that Scalia’s principles always lead him to the “conservative” outcome. For example, his commitment to the text of the Constitution and statutes have led him to be an unlikely champion of the rights of criminal defendants and terrorist detainees in Guantanamo (in the earlier detainee cases). He didn’t decide those cases the way he did because he is a pragmatist; he decided them based on a principled reading of legal texts.
Second, judicial minimalism. This one is trickier. The article suggests that Obama is skeptical of the courts imposing too much social change all at once; the courts shouldn’t get too far out in front of public opinion, or they risk losing their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Fair enough. As a descriptive matter, I think Obama is correct here. The Supreme Court always enjoys a much higher approval rating than the President and Congress, partly because most of the really big political decisions that affect people’s lives don’t come from the Court. The Court tends to make fewer people mad than the other two branches (with some notable exceptions). But let us examine the presuppositions of Obama’s supposedly minimalist views, and how they relate to his views on pragmatism. First, Obama’s view (or at least the article’s take on his view) is that some amount of social change is indeed within the province of the Supreme Court. As an abstract matter, social change is not part of the Supreme Court’s job description. We typically leave that to the state and national legislatures. Judges, by contrast, are supposed to judge – to compare the case they have in front of them to the socio-legal standards already enshrined in our Constitution and laws. Even a “minimalist” approach to social change is too much, if the texts at issue do not mandate it. Conversely, the governing texts may legitimately require the Court to get way out in front of public opinion (Exhibit A: Brown v. Board of Education), and so an overly minimalist attitude might prevent a judge from doing real justice. Bottom line: judges should not be minimalists any more than they should eagerly search for ways to impose. They should simply go where the language of our legal texts lead them.
Finally, a word on the three possible nominees mentioned in the article: Cass Sunstein, Elena Kagan, and Diane Wood. Notwithstanding the previous two paragraphs, I think all three are extraordinarily intelligent and highly-qualified for a seat on the Court. They are legal thinkers who take ideas (dare I say “abstraction”?) and texts seriously, and in the vast majority of cases would perform their duties admirably. (Full disclosure: I argued in front of Judge Wood during a moot court competition and have seen her on the bench several times; she is tough, well-prepared, and doesn’t let lawyers get away with anything.) Conservatives will not agree with them on everything, but we need to have realistic expectations of any Obama nominee. The President is owed deference on his nominations, as long as they are qualified, as Sunstein, Wood, and Kagan undoubtedly are.